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INTRODUCTION
Repeated instances of detention, torture and, in one case, murder of Canadian 
citizens by foreign governments have rocked Canada’s foreign policy establishment. 
In October 2003, Maher Arar arrived in Canada after being detained in Syrian 
military prison for more than a year on unsupported terrorism suspicions. In 2002, 
Arar -  a dual Canadian-Syrian national -  had been returning to Canada from a 
holiday in Tunisia via the United States. He was promptly arrested by U.S. 
authorities during his stopover in New York on suspicion of terrorist connections, 
and deported to Jordan. After administering a beating, Jordanian officials then 
removed Mr. Arar to Syria, the country of his birth. While in Syria, Syrian agents 
tortured Mr. Arar,1 sparking an inquiry by the Government of Canada into its role in 
Mr. Arar’s treatment.2
Mr. Arar’s case, and the similar treatment of several other Arab-Canadians 
detained in Egypt and Syria in the years following 9/11 have sparked enormous 
controversy in Canada.3 These events follow hard on the heels of the arrest and
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beating death of Zahra Kazemi, a 54-year old photojoumalist with dual Canadian- 
Iranian nationality, by Iranian authorities in June 2003. They also follow in the wake 
of the detention and torture of Canadian-UK citizen William Sampson for two and 
one-half years in Saudi Arabia.4
Some critics have cited these events as new evidence of Canada’s flagging 
influence in the community of nations, and of the failures of its “soft power” foreign 
policy.5 Others have suggested more sinister motives, at least in relation to the 
treatment of Mr. Arar and other Arab-Canadians; namely, a Canadian policy of 
extraordinary rendition of terrorist suspects to torturing regimes.6 Under these 
circumstances, these instances of maltreatment of Canadian citizens abroad raise 
more than political and foreign policy issues. They also raise important and complex 
questions about Canada’s legal liability to those injured by foreign abuse. Most 
obviously, in what circumstance would Canada itself incur responsibility for 
mistreatment inflicted by a foreign state? Two logical possibilities present 
themselves: first, responsibility incurred because of complicity in the commission of 
the harm and second, responsibility flowing from omission; that is, a failure to 
intervene (or intervene properly) to forestall the abuse.
Acts of complicity in the maltreatment of a state’s nationals by another state is 
arguably the most straight forward of the two prospective sources of responsibility. 
An active contribution to an injury is readily cognizable as a source of responsibility 
in international law and liability in domestic law. On the other hand, whether 
responsibility flows from a failure to intervene and prevent abuse is a more difficult 
question. Certainly, the notion that states may act to protect their nationals is one of 
the oldest doctrines of international law, known generally as diplomatic protection. 
More contentious is whether a state is obligated to extend this diplomatic protection 
to its nationals. A natural corollary question is whether a state thatfails to extend 
diplomatic protection to its nationals might be liable for this omission.
4 During his detention, Mr. Sampson was forced to confess, apparently under duress, to a bombing in 
Saudi Arabia. In fact, Sampson and six other foreigners were widely perceived by Saudi critics as 
scapegoats from attacks conducted by Islamic militants. “Canada welcomes release of Canadian 
detained in Saudi Arabia” Agence France Presse (8 August 2003), 2003 WL 69499596. During his 
imprisonment, Sampson was reportedly tortured. Louise Elliott and Alexander Panetta, “Torture 
claims not revealed; Foreign Affairs feared reprisals” Hamilton Spectator (14 August 2003), 2003 
WLNR 5991110 (WeC).
5 See e.g. then-opposition member of Parliament Stockwell Day labeling Ms. Kazemi’s treatment in Iran 
as displaying “the utter failure of soft power and soft diplomacy.” Stephanie Rubec, “Diplomat 
Returns To Iran; To Push For Kazemi’s Body, Public Trial” Toronto Sun (30 September 2003) 18.
6 See e.g. Amnesty International (Canada), “Restoring his rights, addressing his wrongs. Amnesty 
International's closing submissions to the Committee of Inquiry” (10 September 2005), online: 
<http://www.amnesty.ca/human_rights_issues/arar_documents/Arar_closing_submission_septlO.pdC> 
(describing the Arar and other cases as perhaps “tantamount to a Canadian variation of the notorious 
U.S. practice of extraordinary rendition, whereby individuals are transferred by one government into 
the hands Qf police and jailers in another country, outside of the usual framework of legal and human 
rights safeguards.” at 10).
The article that follows does not engage the legal questions raised by possible 
Canadian complicity in maltreatment. Instead, this paper takes up the broader legal 
questions raised by the diplomatic protection matter: is the government obligated to 
intercede and protect its citizens? It does so in three parts. Part I briefly sets the 
factual stage for this study. Without pronouncing on the merits of these claims, it 
examines controversies over Canadian diplomatic and consular practices in relation 
to Canadians detained abroad. Part II then focuses on the extent to which Canada is 
obliged to extend diplomatic protection to its nationals overseas; that is, whether 
diplomatic protection is a duty under either international or domestic public law. 
Finally, Part III considers whether a failure to meet such a putative public law 
obligation gives rise to liability in Canadian law.
The article concludes that decisions concerning diplomatic protection are 
amenable to scrutiny in Canadian public law, potentially as a constitutional matter 
and almost certainly as part of administrative law. In the right circumstances, a 
failure to extend diplomatic protection could be actionable in private law, although 
success in such a lawsuit would oblige a plaintiff to overcome important legal and 
evidentiary hurdles. All told, the legal context for diplomatic protection remains 
rudimentary. The article urges that this situation be corrected.
I. CONTROVERSIES IN DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION 
1. Defining Diplomatic Protection
In international law, “diplomatic protection” is a concept with several guises. In its 
classic form, it includes “an international proceeding, constituting ‘an appeal by 
nation to nation for the performance of the obligations of the one to the other, 
growing out of their mutual rights and duties’.”7 In keeping with this broad 
definition, the United Nations International Law Commission’s Special Rapporteur 
on Diplomatic Protection (ILC Rapporteur) recently defined the concept as an 
“action taken by a State against another State in respect of an injury to the person or 
property of a national caused by an internationally wrongful act or omission 
attributable to the latter State.”8 While the ILC Rapporteur included many examples 
of state conduct in his definition of “action”, a key component includes the pursuit of 
judicial or arbitral proceedings. Known as “espousal of claims”, diplomatic 
protection of this sort involves a state prosecuting a complaint against another 
country, one that has committed an internationally wrongful act against the first 
state’s national. Put simply, espousal of claims is a species of international lawsuit 
where a state steps into the shoes of its injured national.
7 E. M. Borchard, The Diplomatic Protection o f Citizens Abroad or The Law of International Claims 
(New York, The Banks Law Publishing Co.: 1915) at 354.
8 J. Dugard, First Report on Diplomatic Protection, International Law Commission, Fifty-second 
Session, A/CN.4/506 (2000) at 11.
“Diplomatic protection” is supplemented by “consular protection”, a function 
with a strong treaty base in modem international law. 9 Consular protection is the 
key preoccupation of this article. Article 3 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations (VCCR) lists, as one of the functions of a diplomatic mission, “protecting 
in the receiving state the interests of the sending state and its nationals, within the 
limits permitted by international law.”10 The VCCR asserts a similar role for 
consular officials,11 and some authorities describe the protection of nationals as a 
consul’s central task.12
The VCCR also sets out specific responsibilities of “receiving” states in 
facilitating consular assistance of detained, “sending” state nationals. Thus, Article 
36 provides that consular officials are “free to communicate with nationals of the 
sending State and to have access to them”. Nationals of the sending state have a 
reciprocal freedom to communicate with, and have access to, consular officers of the 
sending State. Moreover, upon request of that national, the receiving state must 
inform consular officials that a national is detained. In a provision at issue in two 
recent International Court of Justice (ICJ) cases,13 the receiving state must inform 
“without delay” the detained alien of his or her right to contact consular officials. In 
Avena, the International Court of Justice concluded that this obligation arises 
immediately upon receiving state officials learning (or suspecting) that the detained 
individual is a foreign national.14 Once notified of the detention, consular officials 
then have a right to visit and converse with their national and arrange for his or her 
legal representation, unless refused by the national.15
9 For the purposes of this article, “diplomatic protection” is used to describe both espousal of claims and 
consular protection. In so doing, it follows Albrecht Randelzhofer, “Nationality”, in Rudolph 
Bernhardt, ed., Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Amsterdam : North-Holland, 1997) 506 (“A 
State’s right of diplomatic protection comprises two aspects: firstly, the helping and protecting of 
nationals abroad in the pursuance of their rights and other lawful activities by consular or diplomatic 
organs ...; secondly, the claiming of compensation from a State which has treated the nationals of the 
protecting State in a manner incompatible with international law” at 506). There is, however, a 
strongly held few that consular protection is a separate species of law because of its strong treaty base 
and different focus. See e.g. Annemarieke Kiinzli, “Exercising Diplomatic Protection: The fine line 
between litigation, demarches and consular assistance,” (2006) 66 ZaôRV 321. This article does not 
take up this issue, if only because the applicable principles discussed in it likely apply to diplomatic 
protection in all of its manifestations.
10 18 April 1961, 500 U.N.T.S. 95 [VCCR],
11 24 April 1963, 596 U.N.T.S. 261, art. 5.
12 See discussion in Luke Lee, Consular Law and Practice, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991) at
124 et seq.
13 See Avena and other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America), Judgment, [2004] I.C.J. 
Rep. 128 [Avena]; and LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), Judgment, [2001] I.C.J. Rep. 
466.
14 Avena, ibid. at para. 63.
15 VCCR, 24 April 1963, Art.36(l)(c).
2. Canadian Practice
Like other states, Canada does extend diplomatic protection to its nationals abroad, 
most frequently expressed in the form of consular assistance. Konrad Sigurdson, 
Director General, Consular Affairs Bureau, Department of Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade (DFAIT), told a parliamentary committee in 2003 that “Canada 
has one of the best consular assistance programs in the world.” In 2002, his office 
“handled close to 170,000 formal cases, involving but not limited to arrest and 
detention cases, death abroad, medical assistance, repatriation, well-being and 
whereabouts investigations, assistance with loss or theft of property and passports, 
and the processing of citizenship applications.” One percent of these cases 
concerned arrests or detentions, three quarters of which occurred in the United 
States, usually on drug-related charges.16
Most of these consular cases are apparently resolved without controversy. 
However, several high profile detentions of Canadian citizens by foreign states have 
prompted criticism that Canada does not do enough to extend diplomatic protection 
to its nationals.17 The accusations leveled against Canadian officials vary. In cases 
such as that of Mr. Arar, Abdullah Almalki, Ahmad Abou-El Maati and Muayyed 
Nureddin -  all detained and tortured in Syria -  suspicions have been raised that 
consular officials were (at best) willfully blind to torture in Syria and inept in then- 
handling of these men’s cases.
In its closing submissions to the Arar Commission, for instance, Amnesty 
International flagged a number of important questions about the action of Canadian 
officials, raised by the evidence before the inquiry. For example, “[t]he allegations 
of torture in Syria that were conveyed by Mr. El Maati during a consular visit in 
Egypt in July 2002 do not appear to have been circulated to all appropriate officials 
and do not appear to have influenced how subsequent cases such as Mr. Almalki, Mr. 
Arar and Mr. Nureddin were approached.”18 Subsequently, disagreements and poor 
communications between government agencies “obstructed the formulation of a 
unified Canadian government statement to Syrian officials regarding Mr. Arar’s case, 
and may have delayed high-level diplomatic efforts to secure his return to Canada.” 19 
Moreover, “[t]he actions of various government officials, [including the then- 
Canadian ambassador] conveyed an impression to Syrian officials that there was
16 House of Commons, Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Evidence, 37th 
Pari., 2nd Sess. (25 September 2003).
17 In many of these cases, the citizen in question was a dual nationality, also possessing the nationality of 
the injuring state. Dual nationality has implications in public international law for diplomatic 
protection. For a discussion of this issue, see Craig Forcese, “The Capacity to Protect: Diplomatic 
Protection of Dual Nationals in the ‘War on Terror”’ (2006) 17 EJ.I.L. 369; and Craig Forcese, 
“Shelter from the Storm: Rethinking Diplomatic Protection of Dual Nationals in Modem International 
Law” (2005) 37 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 469.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
considerable Canadian interest in the results of interrogations and no Canadian 
concern about the possibility of torture.” 20 Indeed, “Canadian Embassy officials in 
Syria, including the Ambassador and the consular officer assigned to Mr. Arar’s 
case, failed to take the risk of torture seriously.”21
These concerns were largely borne out by the findings of the public inquiry into 
the Arar matter, released in Fall 2006. Thus, “[o]n receiving a summary of a 
statement made by Mr. Arar while in Syrian custody in early November 2002, 
DFAIT distributed it to the RCMP and CSIS without informing them that the 
statement was likely a product of torture. That statement became the basis for 
heightened suspicion in some minds about Mr. Arar’s involvement in terrorism.” 
Further, “CSIS received information about Mr. Arar from the Syrian Military 
Intelligence (SMI) and did not do an adequate reliability assessment as to whether 
the information was likely the product of torture. Indeed, its assessment was that it 
probably was not.” Subsequently,
the RCMP, acting through the Canadian Ambassador, sent the SMI 
questions for Abdullah Almalki, the subject of the relevant investigation 
and also in Syrian custody. This action very likely sent a signal to Syrian 
authorities that the RCMP approved of the imprisonment and interrogation 
of Mr. Almalki and created a risk that the SMI would conclude that Mr.
Arar, a person who had some association with Mr. Almalki, was 
considered a serious terrorist threat by the RCMP.
Later, “DFAIT failed to take steps to address the statement by Syrian officials that 
CSIS did not want Mr. Arar returned to Canada.” Overall, “[o]n several occasions, 
there was a lack of communication among the Canadian agencies involved in Mr. 
Arar’s case. There was also a lack of a single, coherent approach to efforts to obtain 
his release.”22
These themes recur in other complaints about Canadian consular and 
diplomatic practices. Omar Khadr, currently on trial before a U.S. military tribunal 
for the shooting death of a U.S. solider in the Afghan war, has alleged in an on-going 
proceeding before the Federal Court that Canadian consular officials have not 
interceded properly with U.S. officials in his case, and indeed that they have 
collaborated with American intelligence agencies in interrogating him.
For his part, William Sampson has accused Canadian officials of willful 
blindness or indifference to his treatment at the hands of Saudi Arabia following his
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 All quotations in the paragraph are drawn from Arar Commission, supra note 1 at 14-15.
23 Khadr v. Canada, 2004 F.C. 1145 (F.C.T.D.) [Khadr],
incarceration in that country on fabricated charges.24 In 2003, he told a 
parliamentary committee:
Throughout my incarceration I considered that the activities of the 
[Canadian] embassy officials...fell well short of anything that could be 
considered supportive. Their behaviour and treatment of my family, of my 
father in particular when he visited Saudi Arabia, was thoroughly 
inadequate. ... [I]t would appear that the Department of Foreign Affairs 
operated from the earliest stages as if I were guilty, long before I even had 
a trial, a trial that turned out to be nothing more than a farce, a trial at 
which I was brought before three judges without representation, without 
witnesses to the event other than those provided by the Saudi Arabian 
government.25
Finally, Zahra Kazemi’s son has alleged that the Canadian government has 
been lukewarm in the enthusiasm with which it has sought answers and reparations 
from Iran with regards to the beating murder of his mother.26
There are two sides to any accusation, and Canadian government officials are 
constrained in their ability to answer these charges. Some observers have cautioned 
that Canada’s consular assistance often must be conducted behind closed doors, a 
reality that makes it difficult to dispel impressions of inaction.27 This author has 
conversed with government officials about some of the charges listed above, and 
these public servants reject as spurious the notion that they failed to do everything 
reasonably in their power to assist their co-nationals. Further, in the case of Mr. 
Arar, the official inquiry’s assessment of Canadian consular (as opposed to police) 
actions was generally positive. Meanwhile, the Khadr accusations remained 
unproven. It would be wrong, therefore, to conclude that these claims are established 
or indeed that all will prove meritorious. It is also important to underscore that these 
controversial matters are few in number, as compared to the vast number of cases 
handled by consular officials each year.
Nevertheless, these claims are serious enough to spark concerns about the 
effectiveness of government practices where Canadians are detained by repressive 
regimes. The DFAIT itself reacted to these controversies by announcing in 2004 its 
intent to develop a “clear protocol for managing difficult cases -  those involving 
detention, reports of torture, and disregard for customary consular and diplomatic 
practices”, to increase “awareness training” for consular officers in order “to assist 
them in recognizing cases where torture or other abuse has occurred”, and to review
24 Canadian Press, “Sampson lambastes government, calls for public inquiry” Halifax Daily News (7 
November 2003) 12.
25 Testimony of Mr. William Sampson to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign 
Affairs and International Trade, Evidence, 37th Pari., 2nd Sess. (6 November 2003).
26 Sean Gordon, “Canada has few options to make Iran co-operate in Kazemi case” Ottawa Citizen (30 
July 2004) A5.
27 Harry Sterling, “Helping Canadians in foreign jails” Calgary Herald ( 17 November 2003) A9.
“the handling of situations where torture is suspected”.28 There is no doubt that this 
response is driven by politics and the notoriety of the events described above. The 
question to which this article now turns is whether such a reaction might also be 
driven by law. Specifically, is access to adequate diplomatic protection a right that 
Canadian citizens possess?
II. THE OBLIGATION TO INTERCEDE
1. Diplomatic Protection in International Law
A right existing in international law may be incorporated into domestic 
constitutional29 or administrative law,30 even where it flows from an unimplemented 
treaty. A right that exists in customary international law is theoretically of direct 
effect in Canadian common law, unless supplanted by an inconsistent statutory 
regime.31 It is less clear that an international right is cognizable as a tort, if only 
because international law rarely creates an international cause of action. Still, it is 
conceivable that observance of an international right might have a bearing in 
domestic tort law as a measure, for example, of the applicable standard of care that 
should be employed by a government official in exercising governmental functions -  
a matter raised below. It is instructive, therefore, to commence a discussion of a 
putative right to diplomatic protection with a brief review of the public international 
law on the subject.
A state’s entitlement to exercise diplomatic protection is unquestionable. In the 
Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions case, the Permanent Court of International 
Justice held that “a State is entitled to protect its subjects, when injured by acts 
contrary to international law committed by another State, from whom they have been 
unable to obtain satisfaction through the ordinary channels.”32 In extending such
28 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, “Report on Plans and Priorities” in Foreign Affairs Canada, 
No. BT31-2/2005-III-52 (24 September 2004).
29 Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3, 2002 SCC 1 (holding 
that the content of Charter s.7 was informed by the UN Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment, even if the provision of that treaty in question was 
not transformed into Canadian law by statute of Parliament).
30 Baker v. Canada (Minister o f Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817,174 D.L.R. (4th) 194 
(holding that the Convention on the Rights of the Child informed the scope of reasonable 
administrative behaviour, even when not transformed into Canadian law by statute of Parliament).
31 See e.g. Jose Pereira E Hijos S. A. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1997] 2 F.C. 84 (sub nom. Hijos 
(Jose Pereira E) SA. v. Canada (Attorney General)), 126 F.T.R. 167 (“The principles concerning the 
application of international law in our courts are well settled ... One may sum those up in the 
following terms: accepted principles of customary international law are recognized and are applied in 
Canadian courts, as part of the domestic law unless, of course, they are in conflict with domestic law.” 
at para. 20).
32 [1924] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 2, at 12.
protection, reasoned the Court, a state was merely preserving its own rights; namely, 
“its right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the rules of international 
law.”33
Other commentators have sometimes gone further. As early as 1758, 
Emmerich de Vattel claimed, in his treatise The Law of Nations, that “whoever uses a 
citizen ill indirectly offends the State, which is bound to protect this citizen.”34 Yet, 
de Vattel’s reference to a state being “bound” was -  and is -  disputable.35 In relation 
to consular access, the language of Article 36 of the VCCR bestows upon a sending 
state a right to controlled access to its nationals detained in the receiving state. It 
does not impose an obligation to seek that access. Likewise, in discussing customary  
international law in the Barcelona Traction Case, the ICJ observed that “[t]he State 
must be viewed as the sole judge to decide whether its protection will be granted, to 
what extent it is granted, and when it will cease. It retains in this respect a 
discretionary power the exercise of which may be determined by considerations of a 
political or other nature, unrelated to the particular case.”36
In 2000, the ILC Rapporteur suggested moving away from this discretionary 
standard. Instead, he proposed the imposition of a duty to extend diplomatic 
protection in most instances where the injury results from a grave violation of 
international law; specifically, those transgressing jus cogens or peremptory 
norms.37 Further, states would be “obliged to provide in their municipal law for the 
enforcement of this right [to diplomatic protection] before a competent domestic 
court or other independent national authority.”38
33 Ibid.
34 Emmerich deVattel, Law of Nations ed. by Joseph Chitty (Philadelphia: T. & J. W. Johnson, 1833) at
161 [emphasis added].
See Richard B. Lillich, The Human Rights o f Aliens in Contemporary International Law (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1984) (“The doctrine as it actually developed was that the State was 
entitled to protect its citizens abroad if it so chose. However, it was under no duty, domestically or 
internationally, to do so.” at 9).
36 19701.C.J. 6 at 44.
A jus cogens — or peremptory — norm “is a norm accepted and recognized by the international 
community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be 
modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character”. Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, Art. 53. The ban on torture would likely be 
listed among these norms. For a discussion of the jus cogens nature of the prohibition on torture, see 
e.g. Commentaries to the draft articles on Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts, 
U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, Comment 1, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001) adopted by the 
International Law Commission at its fifty-third session (2001) (“Although not specifically listed in the 
Commission’s commentary to article 53 of the Vienna Convention, the peremptory character of certain 
other norms seems also to be generally accepted. This applies to the prohibition against torture as 
defined in article 1 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment of 10 December 1984. The peremptory character of this prohibition has 
been confirmed by decisions of international and national bodies.” at 284) online: 
<http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/ 9 6 2001 ,pdf>.
38 Dugard, supra note 8 at 27 (draft Art. 4).
Yet, the full UN International Law Commission rejected this approach, 
preferring the classic position in its draft articles on diplomatic protection, adopted in 
2004:
A State has the right to exercise diplomatic protection on behalf of a 
national. It is under no duty or obligation to do so. The internal law of a 
State may oblige a State to extend diplomatic protection to a national, but 
international law imposes no such obligation.39
National courts have come to similar conclusions. Thus, in Kaunda v. 
President of the Republic of South Africa, the South African Constitutional Court 
recently considered both the ILC’s work and the ICJ’s holding in Barcelona 
Traction.40 The Court concluded that while several nations guarantee diplomatic 
protection in their domestic law, the weight of state practice continued to 
demonstrate that “diplomatic protection remains the prerogative of the state to be 
exercised at its discretion.”41 The courts of other states have reached identical 
conclusions.42
In sum, a right to diplomatic protection does not exist in international law. 
Canada therefore violates no international obligation if it declines to extend 
diplomatic protection (of a consular sort or otherwise) to its nationals.
2. Diplomatic Protection in Domestic Law
Whether diplomatic protection is required as part of Canadian domestic law is a 
more complex question. Before examining this matter, it is worth first canvassing 
the comparative context: states whose domestic laws do mandate diplomatic 
protection, either constitutionally or through some other means. Comparative law 
may prove influential in a Canadian context, not least in the administrative law area 
of “legitimate expectation” where developments in the United Kingdom have had a 
resounding and lasting impact on Canadian jurisprudence. The existence of a
39 ILC, Report of the International Law Commission -  56th Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/59/10) 2004 
at 27.
40 [2004] 10 B. Const. L.R. 1009 (S. Afr. Const. Ct.), CCT 23/04, online: <http://www.constitutional 
court.org.za> [Kaunda],
41 Ibid. at para. 29.
42 Lay Kon Tji v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1998), 158 A.L.R. 681 (F.C.A.) (“[A] 
national does not have a right to diplomatic protection from his or her state; that is, it is not a right of 
nationality. Diplomatic protection is the right of the state to intervene on behalf of its nationals. The 
state has complete discretion whether to exercise this right and is not in any way bound to protect its 
nationals” at 693.); and R (on the application ofAbbasi and another) v. Secretary of State for Foreign 
and Commonwealth Affairs, [2002] E.W.C.A. Civ. 1598 (Eng. C.A.) [AZwrni] (“It is clear that 
international law has not yet recognised that a State is under a duty to intervene by diplomatic or other 
means to protect a citizen who is suffering or threatened with injury in a foreign State.” at para. 69). 
But see Khadr, supra note 23 at para. 27 (where the court was apparently persuaded that the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations create “individual rights” to consular services potentially 
enforceable against the sending state, in this case Canada).
putative Canadian public law obligation may in turn have a bearing on whether civil 
liability attaches to government officials who violate this standard, a matter 
discussed in the final part of this article.
(A) Comparative Context
i. Constitutional Obligations
A number of states extend constitutional guarantees of diplomatic protection to their 
nationals of varying scope.43 As summarized by the ILC Rapporteur, most of these 
provisions specify “the State shall protect the legitimate rights of X nationals abroad” 
or “nationals of Y shall enjoy protection while residing abroad”.44 Even in some 
nations without such explicit constitutional rules, courts applying constitutional 
doctrines have discerned an obligation to provide diplomatic protection. Thus, in 
Germany, the Constitutional Court has held that the German State has “a 
constitutional duty to provide protection for German nationals and their interests in 
relation to foreign States”.45
Yet, the extent to which these constitutional protections are truly justiciable in 
these states is uncertain. In his review of the formal constitutional promises of 
diplomatic protection found in several states, the ILC Rapporteur observed: “It is 
uncertain whether and to what extent those rights are enforceable under the 
municipal law of those countries, and whether they go beyond the right of access to 
consular officials abroad.”46 Even where judicial review is available, it is often 
tender in its treatment of government action. In the German jurisprudence, the 
Constitutional Court has underscored that the government “enjoys wide discretion in 
deciding the question of whether and in what manner to grant protection against 
foreign States”. As the Court observed:
in the sphere of foreign policy, the Federal Government, as all other 
organs with responsibility for political dealings, generally has more room 
for political manoeuvre and consequently wider discretion. ...[This 
discretion] is based on the fact that shape of foreign relations and the 
course of their development are not determined solely by the wishes 
of...Germany and are much more dependent upon circumstances beyond 
its control.47
43 Dugard, supra note 8 at 30. The states constitutionalizing this protection include: Albania, Belarus, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Cambodia, China, Croatia, Estonia, Georgia, Guyana, Hungary, 
Italy, Kazakhstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Republic of 
Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Spain, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, 
Ukraine, Viet Nam and Yugoslavia.
44 Ibid.
45 Fed. Constitutional Court, 15 December 1980, Rudolph Hess Case, I.L.R. 1992. 387 at 395, 80-2 BvR 
419 [Hew],
46 Dugard, supra note 8 at 30.
47 Hess, supra note 45 at 395-96.
This emphasis on deference also animates a recent string of notable South 
African constitutional cases, albeit in a fashion that leaves room for judicial 
intervention. In Kaunda, at issue was whether 69 South Africans accused of 
planning a coup in Zimbabwe against nearby Equatorial Guinea were constitutionally 
entitled under South African law to the diplomatic protection of South Africa. These 
plotters had been charged under Zimbabwe law with various firearms offences and 
Zimbabwe was contemplating their extradition to Equatorial Guinea, where 
execution seemed possible.
As noted above, the South African Constitutional Court concluded that 
international law did not oblige the extension by South Africa of diplomatic 
protection to its nationals. The balance of the judgment dealt, therefore, with a 
possible domestic constitutional source for this requirement. In addressing this 
question, substantial emphasis was placed by the applicants on sub-section 7(2) of 
the South African Bill of Rights: “The state must respect, protect, promote and fulfil 
the rights in the Bill of Rights”.48 This provision, applicants urged, obliged South 
Africa to protect other constitutional rights, such as fair trial guarantees, even outside 
South Africa. In the circumstances of the case, this obligation would be met by 
extending diplomatic protection.49
On this issue, a majority of the Court concluded that the Constitution did not 
compel the government to offer protection to the South African detainees, in large 
measure because South African constitutional obligations do not have extraterritorial 
reach. The Court did acknowledge the extra-South African extension of 
constitutional law where the agents of the South African state were themselves 
implicated in alleged wrongdoing.50 However, the Court held that on the facts in 
Kaunda, the South African government was involved only to the point of providing 
intelligence about the coup-plotters. Giving notice to a foreign state of the planned 
illicit conduct of South African nationals did not constitute a constitutional violation. 
It concluded that:
the actors responsible for the action against which the applicants demand 
protection from the South African government are all actors in the employ 
of sovereign states over whom our government has no control. The laws to 
which objection is taken are the laws of foreign states who are entitled to 
demand that they be respected by everyone within their territorial 
jurisdiction, and also by other states. The applicants have no right to 
demand that the government take action to prevent those laws being 
applied to them.51
48 Chapter 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.
49 Kaunda, supra note 40 at para. 31.
50 Ibid. at para. 57.
51 Ibid. at para. 41 (citing R. v. Cook, [1998] 2 SCR 597).
In so finding, the majority conflated a putative domestic legal obligation to 
provide protection with an extraterritorial assertion of jurisdiction by South Africa. 
O’Regan J., dissenting on this point, highlighted the difficulty with the majority 
position: at issue in the case was whether “the South African government, to the 
extent that it has the right in international law to make diplomatic representations to 
another state on behalf of one of its nationals, is under an obligation under our 
Constitution to make such representations.”52 Put another way, the sole question 
was whether the South African government itself, under the constitutional apparatus 
that governed it, was obliged to exercise its acknowledged international right to 
extend diplomatic protection. Extraterritoriality was a red herring, since the heart of 
the matter concerned the South African government’s own compliance with 
constitutional rules, not the extraterritorial imposition of South African constitutional 
rules on some foreign actor.
Perhaps for this very reason, the majority did not completely reject the 
applicants’ constitutional case. In the second half of its decision, it saw past its focus 
on territoriality to conclude that the South African Constitution is not completely 
inert on the question of diplomatic protection. Specifically, the majority 
supplemented its understanding of sub-section 7(2) with an interpretation of section 
3 of the Bill of Rights: “All citizens are — (a) equally entitled to the rights, 
privileges and benefits of citizenship.” Read together, these two constitutional 
provisions entitled citizens to request diplomatic protection and imposed “a 
corresponding obligation” on the government “to consider the request and deal with 
it consistently with the Constitution.”53
“[C]ourts,” warned the majority, “must exercise discretion and recognize that 
government is better placed than they are to deal with such matters.”54 Nevertheless, 
there may be:
a duty on government, consistent with its obligations under international 
law, to take action to protect one of its citizens against a gross abuse of 
international human rights norms. A request to the government for 
assistance in such circumstances where the evidence is clear would be 
difficult, and in extreme cases possibly impossible to refuse. It is unlikely 
that such a request would ever be refiised by government, but if it were, 
the decision would be justiciable, and a court could order the government 
to take appropriate action. ...There may even be a duty on government in 
extreme cases to provide assistance to its nationals against egregious 
breaches of international human rights which come to its knowledge. The 
victims of such breaches may not be in a position to ask for assistance, and 
in such circumstances, on becoming aware of the breaches, the 
government may well be obliged to take an initiative itself.55
52 Kuanda, supra note 40 at para. 230.
53 Ibid. at para. 67.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid. at paras. 69-70.
The Court offered up some additional precision on the circumstances that might 
provoke judicial intervention:
if the decision [in response to a request for protection] were to be 
irrational, a court could intervene. This does not mean that courts would 
substitute their opinion for that of the government or order the government 
to provide a particular form of diplomatic protection. ... If government 
refüses to consider a legitimate request, or deals with it in bad faith or 
irrationally, a court could require government to deal with the matter 
properly.56
The holding Kuanda was explored in 2005 by the Transvaal High Court in Van 
Zyl v. Government of RSA.51 At issue was whether South Africa had infringed the 
applicant’s constitutional rights by failing to extend diplomatic protection after a 
foreign state’s expropriation of the applicant’s mineral properties. The High Court 
distinguished Kaunda's constitutional ruling on the basis that while the latter case 
had grappled with “gross and flagrant infraction of international human rights such 
as physical abuse and torture”, Van Zyl implicated mere expropriation of property.58 
Nevertheless, it concluded that the government’s refusal to extend protection was 
amenable to judicial supervision: “Central to our constitutional order is that both the 
Legislature and Executive in any sphere are constrained by the principle that they 
may exercise no power and perform no function beyond that conferred upon them by 
law.”59 While the foreign policy context of the government’s decision counseled 
deference,60 courts could nevertheless conduct a limited form of judicial review61 on 
a rule of law theory.62 Applying the resulting, tender standard of review, the Court 
concluded that on the facts in Van Zyl, the government had not acted improperly:
the respondents [government officials] were correctly advised and they 
certainly appreciated their powers and the extent of their discretion. They 
did not exercise their power on the basis of wrong understanding of the 
law. The exercise of their powers was certainly not arbitrary as alleged by 
the applicants.63
Read together, the Kaunda and Van Zyl cases suggest that in South Africa, 
courts will scrutinize refusals to extend diplomatic protection against a standard of 
rationality, bad faith, arbitrariness or some other equivalent concept. The
56 Ibid. at paras. 79-80.
57 2005 (11) BCLR 1106 (T) [Van Zyl].
58 Ibid. at para. 42.
59 Ibid. at para. 46.
60 Ibid. at para. 58.
61 Ibid. at para. 56.
62 Ibid. at para. 45 et seq.
63 Ibid. at para. 70.
Constitutional Court’s reasoning in Kaunda implies that a government decision 
violating one of these standards would transgress South African Bill of Rights 
provisions. In Van Zyl, the Transvaal High Court saw no need to characterize an 
arbitrary refusal of protection as a specific rights violation, simply suggesting that 
such an act would be contrary to the rule of law. In so concluding, the Van Zyl 
approach takes on the hue of what Canadian lawyers would call administrative law, a 
point explored below.
ii. Non-Constitutional Obligations
Administrative law has, in fact, driven analyses of diplomatic protection obligations 
in other jurisdictions. The most notable case is R (on the application of Abbasi and 
another) v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, a 2002 
decision of the English Court of Appeal.64 At issue in Abbasi was the potentially 
indefinite detention at Guantanamo Bay of a British national captured by American 
forces in Afghanistan. Mr. Abbasi sought judicial review to compel the United 
Kingdom to intervene diplomatically with the United States. In concluding that the 
United Kingdom was under some obligation, the Court of Appeal pointed to the 
administrative law doctrine of “legitimate expectation”:
the doctrine of “legitimate expectation” provides a well-established and 
flexible means for giving legal effect to a settled policy or practice for the 
exercise of an administrative discretion. The expectation may arise from 
an express promise or “from the existence o f a regular practice which the 
claimant can reasonably expect to continue” ... The expectation is not that 
the policy or practice will necessarily remain unchanged, or, if unchanged, 
that it will not be overridden by other policy considerations. However, so 
long as it remains unchanged, the subject is entitled to have it properly 
taken into account in considering his individual case.65
Canvassing British government public policy assertions on circumstances 
where it would extend diplomatic protection, the Court concluded that “these 
statements indicate a clear acceptance by the government of a role in relation to 
protecting the rights of British citizens abroad, where there is evidence of 
miscarriage or denial of justice.”66
As in similar cases discussed above, the Court noted the considerable deference 
owed to the government in the exercise of foreign policy. Nevertheless, “there is no 
reason why [the government’s] decision or inaction should not be reviewable if it can 
be shown that the same were irrational or contrary to legitimate expectation”.67 
Surely, “the court cannot enter the forbidden areas, including decisions affecting
64 See Abassi, supra note 42.
65 Ibid. at para. 82 [citations omitted].
66 Ibid. at para. 92.
67 Ibid. at para. 106.
foreign policy,” but “an obligation to consider the position of a particular British 
citizen and consider the extent to which some action might be taken on his behalf, 
would seem unlikely itself to impinge on any forbidden area”.68
Mr. Abbasi succeeded, therefore, in persuading the Court of the justiciability of 
his claim. However, on the facts in Abbasi, the Court of Appeal concluded that the 
government had complied with its duty: “the Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
have considered Mr Abbasi’s request for assistance. ... [T]he British detainees are 
the subject of discussions between this country and the United States both at 
Secretary of State and lower official levels. We do not consider that Mr Abbasi 
could reasonably expect more than this.”69 The expectation of diplomatic protection 
accorded Mr. Abbasi was, in other words, quite limited.
(B) Canadian Prospects
This comparative legal review is quite suggestive of potential sources of a Canadian 
legal obligation to provide diplomatic protection. Arguably, Foreign Affairs 
Canada’s legal power to extend diplomatic protection flows from s. 10 of the 
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Act (DFAIT Act):70 “[i]n 
exercising his powers and carrying out his duties and functions under this Act, the 
Minister shall ... (a) conduct all diplomatic and consular relations on behalf of 
Canada”. Alternatively, the diplomatic protection power reflects a royal prerogative 
power over foreign affairs that has not been extinguished and continues to be 
exercised by the Federal Government.71
Yet, neither the DFAIT Act nor the royal prerogative specify the manner in 
which diplomatic and consular functions are to be conducted. More instructive on 
this point are many readily-available information documents on consular services for 
Canadians published by Foreign Affairs. For example, the government indicates in 
its pamphlet, Travelling Abroad? Assistance for Canadians, that “consular services 
of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade provide assistance to 
Canadian travellers. We are committed to helping Canadians prepare for foreign 
travel and to providing you with a variety of services once you’re abroad.” The 
document continues: “Canada’s offices abroad are there to help you in case of an 
emergency. Consular staff, both in our foreign offices and in Ottawa, can: ... 
provide assistance in dealing with the criminal justice system; ... see that you are
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid. at para. 107.
70 R.S.C. 1985, c. E-22 at s. 10(2).
71 See Black v. Canada (Prime Minister), [2001] 54 O.R. (3d) 215 (C.A.) for a brief discussion of 
prerogative powers in the context of foreign affairs [Black], In internal documents, the government 
characterizes consular services as a prerogative function. See Manual 1-3, cited in Lee, supra note 12 
at 127.
treated fairly under the country’s laws if you are arrested; [and]... help in the 
location of missing persons . . among other things.72
In a more specific brochure, tellingly entitled Canadian Consular Services: 
Providing Assistance to Canadians Abroad, Foreign Affairs notes that its consular 
officials “[s]eek to ensure that you are treated fairly under the country’s laws if you 
are arrested or detained.”73 The Department’s long-standing brochure “Bon Voyage, 
But...,’> repeats this passage,74 and admonishes “[i]f you do find yourself in legal 
trouble, contact the nearest Canadian government office at once.”7 Notably, “Bon 
Voyage, But.. .” is a document the Department notes should be taken by Canadians 
on every foreign trip.76
Meanwhile, in its publication, A Guide to Canadians Imprisoned Abroad, the 
Department specifies that “the Government of Canada will make every effort to 
ensure that you receive equitable treatment under the local criminal justice system. It 
will ensure that you are not penalized for being a foreigner, and that you are neither 
discriminated against nor denied justice because you are Canadian ”77
Foreign Affairs’ Consular Service also publishes written Service Standards. 
These standards commit the government to “provide to all Canadians effective and 
efficient service throughout the world. Our commitment is for service characterized 
at all times by sensitivity, empathy, courtesy, speed, accuracy and fairness. ... Every 
effort will be made to obtain solutions for specific problems and to provide the 
required service.” Under its schedule of services, the government lists “Contact with 
Arrested or Detained Persons” as something done within 24 hours, subject to factors 
“beyond its control”.78
In sum, the Government of Canada warns in these documents that its capacity 
to engineer the appropriate treatment of Canadians abroad may be limited, but that it
72 Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Travelling Abroad? Assistance for Canadians, 
online: <http://www.voyage.gc.ca/main/pubs/PDF/travelling_abroad-en.pdfi>.
73 Foreign Affairs Canada, Canadian Consular Services: Providing Assistance to Canadians Abroad 
(Ottawa: Foreign Affairs Canada, 2005) at 2, online: <http://www.voyage.gc.ca/main/pubs 
/PDF/consular_services-en.pdf>.
74 Foreign Affairs Canada, Bon Voyage, But... (Ottawa: Foreign Affairs Canada, 2006) at 3, online: 
<http://www.voyage.gc.ca/main/pubs/PDF/BVB_2006-en.pdf>.
75 Ibid. at 24.
76 Foreign Affairs Canada, Traveller’s Checklist, online: <http://www.voyage.gc.ca/main/before 
/pdfs/ENG%20Traveller.pdf>.
77 Foreign Affairs Canada, A Guide to Canadians Imprisoned Abroad (Ottawa: Foreign Affairs Canada,
2005) at 6, online: <http://www.voyage.gc.ca/main/pubs/PDF/imprisoned_abroad-en.pdC> [emphasis added].
78 Department of Foreign Affairs, Consular Services, Service Standards, online: <http://www.voyage. 
gc.ca/main/about/service_standards-en.asp>.
(quite emphatically) undertakes to do what it can. This impression is affirmed by 
other government statements. In testimony before parliamentary committees, for 
instance, government officials have underscored their commitment to protecting the 
interest of Canadians abroad:
Clearly the protection of Canadians abroad and the representation of their 
interest is a vitally important task for the Department of Foreign Affairs 
and International Trade ... [0]ur success clearly rests on our ability to 
ensure that authorities in the host country recognize and understand their 
legal obligations in terms of the treatment of third party nationals and how 
it is in their best interest to seek a solution that is satisfactory to Canada 
and to Canadians. That’s a given and in the majority of cases, the process 
works. However, in cases where these obligations are not clearly 
understood at the outset, we must work doggedly to convey this message 
to authorities in the host country.79
Under these circumstances, Canadians act quite reasonably if they expect the 
Canadian government to take an interest in their troubles with foreign states. The 
key question to which this article now turns is whether the government must provide 
assistance to these Canadians, either as a constitutional or administrative law matter.
i. Canadian Constitutional Law and Diplomatic Protection
a) Khadr Case
The Canadian Constitution includes no explicit guarantee of diplomatic protection. 
Nor does the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms contain language analogous 
to the sections 3 or 7 of the South African Bill of Rights, invoked in Kuanda. Thus, 
the Charter contains no reference to the “rights, privileges and benefits of 
citizenship”. Nor does it specify that “[t]he state must respect, protect, promote and 
fulfil the rights” in the Charter. Any constitutional obligation to provide diplomatic 
protection must, therefore, stem from the more general language of the Charter.
The most obvious locus for such a right is section 7 of the Charter. “Everyone 
has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived 
thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.” Section 7 
has been invoked as a basis of constitutionalized diplomatic protection in one case. 
Thus, in Khadr v. Canada, 80 a Canadian citizen captured by U.S. forces in 
Afghanistan and detained at Guantanamo Bay sought a court order compelling the 
government to extend to him the consular services described in the Foreign Affairs
79 Mr. John McNee (Assistant Deputy Minister, Africa and Middle East, Department of Foreign Affairs 
and International Trade), Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Evidence, 
37th Pari., 2nd Sess. (25 September 2003). It is also notable that in the Martin government, Member 
of Parliament Dan McTeague was named by the Prime Minister “Parliamentary Secretary to the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs with special emphasis on Canadians Abroad”, increasing the government’s 
profile on the task of assisting Canadians in difficulty abroad. See P.C. 2003-2032 (2003-12-12).
80 Khadr, supra note 23.
publication, A Guide to Canadians Imprisoned Abroad. 81 Among other things, he 
argued that the government’s failure to do so constituted a violation of Charter 
section 7.
The government moved to strike Mr. Khadr’s Notice of Application on the 
basis that it disclosed no cause of action. In allowing the motion in part, the Federal 
Court rejected Khadr’s constitutional argument, concluding that a Charter violation 
arose only where there was a sufficient connection between the Canadian 
government’s actions and the rights deprivation. On the facts, Mr. Kahr had “failed 
to establish an arguable case that the Minister’s decision is a ‘necessary 
precondition’ to the current or future treatment of Omar Khadr by the Government of 
the United States”. Specifically, Khadr had not produced evidence that his 
“circumstances are similar to those of other detainees who have been released from 
Camp Delta or that diplomatic actions by the Canadian government would lead to the 
same result as those taken by foreign governments such as that of the United 
Kingdom, France and Afghanistan.”82
The Court also concluded that nothing in the Charter imposed on the 
government a positive obligation to ensure a person’s life, liberty and security of the 
person. Rather, section 7 barred a government deprivation of these rights. Because 
Khadr had never been in Canadian government custody, the Canadian government 
was “not under a ‘positive obligation’ pursuant to the Charter to address possible 
deprivations of his rights”,83 in this case by a foreign government.
b) Discussion
Mr. Khadr abandoned his appeal of the Federal Court’s judgment in 2005. Kahdr 
represents, therefore, the most definitive word on the diplomatic protection question 
in Canadian law. Read together, the two bases for denying Mr. IGiadr a 
constitutional right to diplomatic protection -  “necessary precondition” and “positive 
obligations” — seem to close firmly the door to a South African-style implied 
constitutional obligation, however limited. It is worth considering, nevertheless, the 
merits of the Federal Court’s conclusions and any constitutional uncertainty left open 
by them.
“Necessary connection” amounts to a causal link between the government’s 
behaviour and the impairment of interests protected by section 7. In applying this 
notion, the Federal Court rested its conclusions on a reading of the Supreme Court of 
Canada’s holding in Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration).M 
In that case, concerning the proposed removal of an alien from Canada to face
81 This document is described above. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
82 Khadr, supra note 23 at para. 16.
83 Ibid. at para. 17.
84 [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3 at para. 54 [Suresh].
potential torture overseas, the Supreme Court concluded that “where Canada’s 
participation is a necessary precondition for the deprivation [of the section 7 right] 
and where the deprivation is an entirely foreseeable consequence of Canada’s 
participation, the government does not avoid the guarantee of fundamental justice 
merely because the deprivation in question would be effected by someone else's 
hand”. Put another way, so long as the government’s action has the effect of making 
the rights violation foreseeably more likely, section 7 is available, even if the right is 
ultimately violated by someone else. For instance, section 7 is triggered where 
Canadian law enforcement officers induce the presence of an applicant in a foreign 
jurisdiction, and there the applicant’s section 7 rights are subsequently abused by 
foreign officials on the strength of evidence supplied by those Canadian officers.85
The Khadr case represents, however, a slightly different situation. At issue was 
the effect of Canadian government inaction on Mr. Khadr’s fate at the hands of 
foreign officials, not the impact of affirmative governmental action. The real issue, 
therefore, is whether the “necessary precondition” test accommodates omissions. 
The Supreme Court’s reference in Suresh to “Canada’s participation [being] a 
necessary precondition” connotes action, not omission. Yet, the Federal Court’s 
reasoning in Khadr suggests that inaction may qualify as a “necessary precondition”, 
at least so long as it can be shown that the omission actually contributes to the rights 
violation. Mr. Khadr did not meet this evidentiary burden: he could not show that 
Canadian intercession would secure his release, as had equivalent interventions by 
other states concerning their own nationals. Nevertheless, on different facts it is 
possible to imagine evidence showing that Canadian government intervention would 
relieve a section 7 violation. For instance, if Canada had a track record of effectively 
interceding with a particular government, that experience might suitably demonstrate 
the foreseeable implications of the government’s inaction in a particular case.
This discussion of “sufficient connection” leads naturally to the Federal Court’s 
second ground for refusing to apply section 7, drawn from Gosselin v. Quebec 
(Attorney General)-}6 “Nothing in the jurisprudence thus far suggests that s. 7 places 
a positive obligation on the state to ensure that each person enjoys life, liberty or 
security of the person. Rather, s. 7 has been interpreted as restricting the state’s 
ability to deprive people of these.”87 The “positive obligation” concept suggests that 
the government is under no obligation to preserve rights that it has not itself 
somehow put in jeopardy. Put another way, like “sufficient connect”, the positive 
obligation concept is linked to causality. In fact, it seems likely that in most
85 Purdy v. Canada, [2003] B.C.J. 1881. In comparison, section 7 is not engaged on this standard where 
the Canadian governmen t’s impugned action post-dates the rights deprivation. For example, the 
Ontario Court of Appeal has held that a law precluding recovery in Canadian courts against foreign 
state torturers does no violence to section 7. In that circumstance, there is no causal connection 
between the government action and the constitutional injury. Bouzari v. Iran (2004), 71 O.R. (3d) 675 
at para. 101 (C.A.).
86 [2002] 4 S.C.R. 429.
87 Ibid. at para. 81.
instances where a “necessary connection” exists per Suresh, the “positive obligation” 
notion is immaterial: in most if not all instances where a necessary connection exists 
by virtue of government action, application of section 7 imposes a negative 
obligation: it restricts the government’s ability to take that action and deprive (or 
participate in the deprivation of) life, liberty or security of the person. In Suresh, for 
instance, at issue was the government’s participation in a deportation to torture. 
Section 7 would restrict the act of deportation, linked causally to the subsequent act 
of torture. No positive obligation is imposed in this scenario.
“Positive obligation” becomes a more substantial hurdle where the “necessary 
connection” is grounded, not in state action, but in inaction: a failure to intervene to 
forestall abuses undertaken by an entity other than the Canadian state. As noted, 
Khadr suggests it is possible for an omission to satisfy the “necessary connection” 
concept. But if the Khadr case’s read of Gosselin is correct, a failure to act 
positively to stop rights violations that will occur irrespective of any government 
action could never constitute an infringement of section 7. There are, however, 
reasons to doubt this conclusion.
First, Gosselin is more nuanced than the single quotation reproduced in Khadr 
suggests. The majority in Gosselin was content to confine its holding on section 7 to 
the facts; specifically whether applicants had a constitutional entitlement to certain 
social welfare benefits.88 Indeed, the majority expressly left open “the possibility 
that a positive obligation to sustain life, liberty, or security of person may be made 
out in special circumstances”.89 In a different situation involving conventional legal 
interests rather than the economically-oriented social benefits actually at issue in 
Gosselin, the Court might have arrived at a very different conclusion. While the 
matter is not without doubt, diplomatic protection of citizens detained overseas 
seems roughly analogous to the conventional legal rights protected by section 7, and 
a plausible candidate for “special circumstances”.
Second, courts have in fact concluded that section 7 is offended by government 
inaction that compounds a risk to life, liberty and security of the person presented by 
non-government actors. In the famous Doe v. Metropolitan Toronto (Municipality) 
Commissioners of Police,90 the plaintiff alleged that police had used her as “bait” to 
capture a rapist, thereby placing her security interest in peril. The court agreed:
defendants deprived the plaintiff of her right to security of the person by 
subjecting her to the very real risk of attack by a serial rapist-a risk of 
which they were aware but about which they quite deliberately failed to
88 Ibid. (“The question therefore is not whether s. 7 has ever been - or will ever be - recognized as 
creating positive rights. Rather, the question is whether the present circumstances warrant a novel 
application of s. 7 as the basis for a positive state obligation to guarantee adequate living standards.” at para. 82).
89 Ibid. at para. 83.
90 (1998), 39 O.R. (3d) 487 (Ont. Gen. Div.) [Doe],
inform the plaintiff ... and where in the face of that knowledge and their 
belief that the rapist would certainly attack again, they additionally failed 
to take any steps to protect the plaintiff or other women like her.91
This holding is strong evidence that police, at least, have a positive section 7 
obligation to minimize the threat to the public posed by a non-governmental actor. 
Whether this obligation extends to other government officials is uncertain. The 
police may have a particularly special relationship with the public. As noted in Doe, 
“[t]he police are statutorily obligated to prevent crime and at common law they owe 
a duty to protect life and property”.92 The existence of a special relationship is not 
nearly as clear with consular officials, where there is no clear statutory or common 
law duty to protect.
As noted above, Foreign Affairs Canada does, in its public utterances, promise 
assistance to Canadians abroad. It seems unlikely that these undertakings suffice to 
create a special relationship analogous to that in Doe, given their non-legal nature. 
At the very least, however, these public undertakings have a bearing on 
administrative law remedies that might be available to citizens, a matter to which this 
article now turns.
ii. Canadian Administrative Law and Diplomatic Protection
a) Khadr Case
Unsuccessful in his constitutional claims, Mr. Khadr made more headway in Federal 
Court with his administrative law arguments. His basic argument was that s. 10 of 
DFAIT Act imposed an affirmative duty on Foreign Affairs to intercede on his 
behalf. Certainly, this provision (reproduced above) imposes an obligation on the 
government to conduct diplomatic and consular relations. It does not, however, 
specify how these relations are to be conducted or exercised. Put another way, this 
passage does not itself guarantee diplomatic protection of each and every Canadian.
Nevertheless, in Khadr, the Federal Court relied on s. 10 and several of the 
statements made in Foreign Affairs Canada documents cited above to conclude that
there is a persuasive case that both the DFAIT A [DFAIT Act] and the 
Guide [to Canadians Imprisoned Abroad] create a legitimate and 
reasonable expectation that a Canadian citizen detained abroad will 
receive many of the services which Omar Khadr has requested. Indeed,
Canadians abroad would be surprised, if not shocked, to learn that the 
provision of consular services in an individual case is left to the complete 
and unreviewable discretion of the Minister.93
91 Ibid. dX52\.
92 Ibid. at 519.
93 Khadr, supra note 23 at para. 22.
In the result, the Court held that Khadr’s application “displays a possible cause 
of action that the decision of the Minister not to provide the appropriate services 
(required under the circumstances) set out in the Guide may constitute a breach of his 
duties under section 10 of the DFAITA”, and declined to strike the Notice of 
Application in full.94 At the time of this writing in Fall 2006, the application had not 
been heard on its merits.
b) Discussion
Although a welcome conclusion from the perspective of plain equity, the Federal 
Court’s decision in Khadr is nevertheless disputable. As described by the Supreme 
Court, legitimate expectation “looks to the conduct of a Minister or other public 
authority in the exercise of a discretionary power including established practices, 
conduct or representations that can be characterized as clear, unambiguous and 
unqualified, that has induced in the complainants ... a reasonable expectation that 
they will retain a benefit or be consulted before a contrary decision is taken”.95 
Measured against this language, the Khadr holding is suspect for at least one key 
reason.
Specifically, a uncertainty in Canadian law is whether legitimate expectation 
extends not just to the procedural conduct of officials, but also to substantive 
outcomes. The conventional view is that it does not.96 Binnie J. did acknowledge in 
his concurring reasons in Mount Sinai Hospital Center v. Quebec,91 that “in some 
cases it is difficult to distinguish the procedural from the substantive”.98 Partially on 
the strength of this observation, the Federal Court in Khadr asserted that “the 
expectation in this case is arguably composed of both procedural and substantive 
elements”.99 However, it is difficult to see an expectation that the government will 
provide consular services as anything other than substantive. The provision of 
diplomatic protection is an outcome, not a procedure governing how a particular 
outcome is arrived at.100
94 Ibid. at para. 29.
95 Canadian Union of Public Employees (C.U.P.E.) v. Ontario (Minister of Labour), [2003] 1 S.C.R. 539 
at para. 131.
96 See e.g. Baker v. Canada, [1999] 2 S.C.R 817 [Baker] (“the doctrine of legitimate expectations cannot 
lead to substantive rights outside the procedural domain” at para. 26).
97 [2001] 2 S.C.R. 281 [Mount Sinai].
98 Ibid. at para. 35.
99 Khadr, supra note 23 at para. 23.
100 An alternative argument — grounded in public law estoppel — might be invoked to capture substantive 
promises, where there has been actual detrimental reliance on undertakings made by the government. 
This doctrine remains, however, ill-formed in Canadian law, and in any event, may be defeated where 
the power exercised by the government official is highly discretionary, involving considerations of 
high policy. See Binnie J., concurring in Mount Sinai, supra note 97 at para. 39 et seq. Arguably, the 
conduct of Canada’s diplomatic and consular relations is a policy-driven exercise of the sort that might 
be excluded from public estoppel.
For this reason, it is not clear that the key administrative law holding in the 
Khadr case will be replicated in future cases. Nevertheless, while not discussed in 
Khadr, Canadian administrative law does create duties for consular officials.
First, while Foreign Affairs Canada’s various documents describing consular 
services offered to Canadians may not create a legitimate expectation that those 
services -  a substantive entitlement -  will actually be provided, they certainly create 
a legitimate procedural expectation that Canadians can request those services and 
have that request considered.
Second, in considering this request, consular officers -  like any other 
government official -  must properly deploy their discretion to exercise (or not) 
diplomatic protection.101 This exercise of discretion is itself amenable to judicial 
scrutiny, albeit inevitably on a gentle standard of review. Specifically, where the 
decision made by the administrative decision-maker is viewed as “discretionary,” 
reviewing courts in Canada have traditionally been undemanding, intervening only in 
response to an “abuse of discretion”. In practice, such an abuse was demonstrated by 
evidence of bad faith, reliance on improper purposes or considerations, or 
discrimination.
As the Supreme Court recently acknowledged in Baker v. Canada,102 this 
approach sat uncomfortably with the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on deference in 
relation to so-called “errors of law” -  errors made by decision-makers in interpreting 
statutes they are obliged to apply. With errors of law, for some time, the Supreme 
Court has extended deference (or not) depending on its assessment of a number of 
variables. These variables -  components of what the Court has called the “pragmatic 
and functional test” -  historically have been marshaled by the court to decide 
whether the error of law is best viewed as a matter within the jurisdiction of the 
administrative decision-maker (in which case it will be disturbed only if “patently 
unreasonable”) or a matter circumscribing the scope of decision-maker’s jurisdiction 
(in which case the court will intervene in response to any error).103
101 This would be true even if diplomatic protection is part of the royal prerogative, rather than a function 
covered by s. 10 of the DFAIT Act. TTie exercise of prerogative powers is justiciable where it affects 
the rights of individuals. See Black, supra note 71 (“the exercise of the prerogative will be justiciable, 
or amenable to the judicial process, if its subject matter affects the rights or legitimate expectations of 
an individual. Where the rights or legitimate expectations of an individual are affected, the court is 
both competent and qualified to judicially review the exercise of the prerogative.” at para. 51).
102 Baker, supra note 96 at para. 54.
103 See generally U.E.S., Local 298 v. Bibeault, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 1048 at para. 123 (setting out the purpose 
and content of the pragmatic and functional test); Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. Canada, [1995] 1 
S.C.R. 157 (discussing the role of the pragmatic and functional test in “distinguishing jurisdictional 
questions from questions of law within a tribunal’s jurisdiction” at para. 30).
After Pushpantham v. Canada,104 this traditional justification of locating the 
error as within or at the margins of the decision-maker’s jurisdiction has eroded and 
the Court engages in the pragmatic and functional test simply to decide how much 
deference need be extended to a decision-maker making an alleged error of law. 
This deference is now measured on a three-point spectrum running from the zero 
deference standard of “correctness”, through the intermediate deference 
“reasonableness simpliciter”, to the maximum deference standard of “patently 
unreasonable”.
In Baker, the Court acknowledged that the distinction between a decision that is 
discretionary -  thus traditionally reviewable on an abuse of discretion standard -  and 
a decision of law -  thus reviewable on a standard determined by the pragmatic and 
functional test -  is often impossible to make.105 Accordingly, in Baker, the Court 
extended the pragmatic and functional test to both discretionary decisions and 
decisions interpreting law.
Since one end of the spectrum produced by this test is no deference at all, Baker 
conceivably opened the door to more demanding review of those decisions once only 
assailable on the grounds of abuse of discretion. 106 Yet, both in practice and 
doctrinally, the Court has been unwilling to apply the non-deferential standard of 
“correctness” to discretionary decisions by at least Ministerial-level decision­
makers. 107 Instead it has often concluded that such decisions are entitled to a level of 
deference equivalent, if not identical, to that traditionally applied under the abuse of
104 Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 982 
[Pushpanathan] (incorporating a three spectrum standard of review into judicial review and noting that 
“it should be understood that a question which ‘goes to jurisdiction’ is simply an error on an issue with 
respect to which, according to the outcome of the pragmatic and functional analysis, the tribunal must 
make a correct interpretation and to which no deference will be shown” at para. 28).
105 Baker, supra 96 at para. 54. See also Suresh, supra note 84 at paras. 35-36 (noting that Baker 
“confirmed that the pragmatic and functional approach should be applied to all types of administrative 
decisions in recognition of the fact that a uniform approach to the determination of the proper standard 
of review is preferable ... The Court specified in Baker that a nuanced approach to determining the 
appropriate standard of review was necessary given the difficulty in rigidly classifying discretionary 
and non-discretionary decisions” at paras. 54-55 [citations omitted]).
106 See generally Dr. Q. v. College of Physicians and Surgeons of British Columbia, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 226 
at para. 24, citing Binnie J. in Mount Sinai, supra note 97 (noting that “under the pragmatic and 
functional approach, even ‘the review for abuse of discretion may in principle range from correctness 
through unreasonableness to patent unreasonableness’. The nominate grounds [of abuse of discretion], 
language of jurisdiction, and ossified interpretations of statutory formulae, while still useful as familiar 
landmarks, no longer dictate the journey.” at para. 54). For a comprehensive discussion of the 
implications of Baker, see David Dyzenhausm, ed., The Unity o f Public Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004).
107 See generally Baker, supra note 96 (“[i]ncorporating judicial review of decisions that involve 
considerable discretion into the pragmatic and functional analysis for errors of law should not be seen 
as reducing the level of deference given to decisions of a highly discretionary nature” at para. 56); 
Mount Sinai, supra note 97, per Binnie J., concurring in the result (“[decisions of Ministers of the 
Crown in the exercise of discretionary powers in the administrative context should generally receive 
the highest standard of deference, namely patent unreasonableness.” at para. 58).
discretion approach. Namely, such decisions must typically be patently 
unreasonable. A patently unreasonable decision has been described as one that is 
clearly irrational. In the Court’s post-Baker error of discretion cases, this sort of 
error has repeatedly been conflated with the classic abuse of discretion requirements 
of bad faith, reliance on improper considerations or such similar flaws.109
On the specifics of a diplomatic protection case, it seems almost certain a court 
would find in favour of substantial deference, a conclusion consistent with the 
unwillingness of courts to second-guess government decisions in areas involving 
complicated policy-weighing on issues where courts have no expertise.110 The 
conduct of Canada’s foreign relations -  something courts do not do -  seems a likely 
candidate for this treatment.
The end result -  review on a standard of patent unreasonableness -  would 
produce an outcome essentially identical to that described in the South African 
jurisprudence on diplomatic protection: review for rationality, bad faith, application 
of irrelevant considerations or some similar concept. Whether this standard was 
violated would turn on the facts. It seems plausible, however, that a refusal to extend 
diplomatic protection premised on, for instance, a desire to facilitate the extraction 
by foreign officials of intelligence from the detainee could transgress the improper 
considerations concept.111
108 Canada (Attorney General) v. Public Service Alliance of Canada, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 941 at 963-64, per 
Cory J.
109 Suresh, supra note 84 (“the reviewing court should adopt a deferential approach to this question and 
should set aside the Minister’s discretionary decision if it is patently unreasonable in the sense that it 
was made arbitrarily or in bad faith, it cannot be supported on the evidence, or the Minister failed to 
consider the appropriate factors.” at para. 29); Ahani v. Canada (Minister o f Citizenship and 
Immigration), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 72 at para. 16 [Ahani]; C.U.P.E. v. Ontario (Minister of Labour), 
[2003] 1 S.C.R. 539 (“In applying the patent unreasonableness test, we are not to reweigh the factors. 
But we are entitled to have regard to the importance of the factors that have been excluded altogether 
from consideration. Not every relevant factor excluded by the Minister from his consideration will be 
fatal under the patent unreasonableness standard. The problem here, as stated, is that the Minister 
expressly excluded factors that were not only relevant but went straight to the heart of the .. .legislative 
scheme” at para. 176). For a comprehensive discussion of Suresh and Baker and their impact on 
adm inistrative law doctrines, see David Elliot, “Suresh and the Common Borders of Administrative 
Law: Time for the Tailor?” (2002), 65 Sask. L. Rev. 469.
110 See Pushpanathan, supra note 104 at para. 32 et seq. (underscoring that the relative expertise of the 
decision-maker as compared to the court is the most important consideration in deciding the level of 
deference that will be accorded under the pragmatic and functional test).
111 There is obviously no precedent on this question. However, in a Federal Court case involving a 
second Khadr brother, at issue was whether the government acted properly in denying Abdurahman 
Khadr a passport on national security grounds. At the time the decision was made, issuance of 
passports was governed by an Order in Council, promulgated under the government’s royal 
prerogative, that did not list national security considerations as a ground for denying a passport. In 
Khadr v. Canada 2004 FC 1719 at para. 13 (FC), the government conceded that the “refusal of a 
passport application on grounds of national security is not within the authority vested in the Passport 
Office by the Canadian Passport Order.” By analogy, a refusal to extend diplomatic protection on 
national security grounds -  a concept not raised in the DFATT Act -  could be conceived as, at 
minimum, an improper purpose.
üi) Conclusion
In sum, there is a public law context for decisions by the Canadian government on 
whether to extend diplomatic protection. The case for a constitutional obligation to 
provide this service is plausible, although not compelling. Meanwhile, a sufficiently 
unreasonable decision to refuse protection would almost certainly provoke court 
intervention on administrative law grounds.
The final question to which this article now turns is the extent to which an 
infraction of these supposed public law obligations would also constitute an 
actionable wrong; that is, one that gives rise to Canadian government liability.
III. LIABILITY FOR FAILING TO INTERCEDE
Depending on one’s assessment of the facts that emerged during testimony before the 
Arar inquiry, it is possible to imagine any number of sources of potential government 
liability, especially if government officials were actively complicit in the 
maltreatment of Canadians at the hands of Syrian and Egyptian torturers. However, 
for the purposes of this discussion, it is assumed that governmental action was not 
actually unlawful -  such as aiding and abetting torture -  and was not motivated by an 
intent to harm. These presumptions are borne out by the findings of the Arar 
Commission, which concluded that Canadian officials were not actually complicit in 
Mr. Arar’s mistreatment by Syrian, Jordanian and U.S. officials.
Suspending the supposition of complicity, there is little room to argue 
misfeasance of public office within the meaning of the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Odhavji Estate v. Woodhouse.112 Rather, this article assumes that the decision 
declining diplomatic protection is lawful conduct, but undertaken without adequate 
regard for the impact on the plaintiff. Put another way, the government’s actions 
constituted an actionable omission. Alternatively, the government undertakes 
diplomatic protection, but in a manner inconsistent with its proposed public duty to 
do so -  for example, diplomatic protection is extended, but is exercised principally as 
an intelligence gathering function and not to serve the best interests of the citizen.
It is possible that even absent malice, such behaviour could ground a remedy in 
money damages under section 24 of the Charter, 113 assuming an affirmative section 
7 entitlement to diplomatic protection exists. This prospect is far from certain,
112 [2003] 3. S.C.R. 263 [Odhavji].
113 For a comprehensive review of the uncertain jurisprudence on constitutional torts and a review of 
whether malice is a requirement, see Hawley v. Bapoo (2005), 76 O.R. (3d) 649 (Ont. S.C.J.) (“The 
case law has not been consistent about whether or not there should be a fault requirement and, if so, 
what it should be.” at para. 186).
however, given the uncertain nature of constitutional torts,114 and a full discussion 
falls beyond the scope of this article. More plausible is a conventional cause of 
action in negligence. Making out this claim in negligence would require a plaintiff 
to demonstrate that the government owed him or her a duty of care (one that required 
action), that the government violated the applicable standard of care (by failing to act 
or by acting inappropriately) and that he or she suffered an injury as a result.
All told, this would not be an easy case for a plaintiff to establish. Not least, 
the absence of an emphatic public law duty to extend diplomatic protection may 
undermine plaintiffs arguments concerning the existence of a duty of care. 
Moreover, a public authority is generally not liable in negligence law where the 
alleged tortious actions are an exercise of pure policy-making, rather than stemming 
from the actual implementation of a policy or from what are called operational 
decisions. This policy/operation dichotomy may preclude the existence of a duty of 
care as between the government and the plaintiff.115 A key issue would, therefore, 
be whether a failure to extend diplomatic protection constitutes an operational, as 
opposed to a pure policy decision.
1. Diplomatic Protection and the Duty of Care
As the Supreme Court has recently reiterated, the duty of care analysis has two 
stages, often called the “Anns test”:
(a) Is there a sufficiently close relationship of proximity between the 
parties such that, in the reasonable contemplation of the defendant, 
carelessness on its part might cause damage to the plaintiff?
(b) If so, are there any considerations which ought to negative or limit:
(a) the scope of the duty; (b) the class of persons to whom it is owed; or
(c) the damages to which a breach of it may give rise?116
The first prong of the Anns test depends on more than mere foreseeability of 
harm; that is, proximity requires something in addition to reasonable foreseeability of
114 See ibid. If a denial of diplomatic protection were a violation of section 7, however, this would be a 
constitutional violation not prescribed by statute, since no such statute exists. This would place the 
case squarely in the zone where money damages for Charter violations, even without malice, may be 
possible. See ibid. at para. 191 et seq.
115 See Just v. British Columbia, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1228 (“As a general rule, the traditional tort law duty of 
care will apply to a government agency in the same way that it will apply to an individual. In 
determining whether a duty of care exists, the first question to be resolved is whether the parties are in 
a relationship of sufficient proximity to warrant the imposition of such a duty. In the case of a 
government agency, exemption from this imposition of duty may ... arise as a result of the nature of 
the decision made by the government agency. That is, a government agency will be exempt from the 
imposition of a duty of care in situations which arise from its pure policy decisions.”).
116 Young v. Bella, 2006 SCC 3 at para. 28. Anns refers to Anns v. Merton London Borough Council, 
[1978] A.C. 728 (P.C.).
the harm flowing from the defendant’s action.117 Proximity inures when there is 
some added quality to the relationship between the parties. These additional 
considerations include “the expectations of the parties, representations, reliance and 
the nature of the property or interest involved”.118 In Odhaviji, one issue was the 
liability of a police chief, police services board and province for negligent 
supervision of police officers. These officers had conducted themselves in a way 
allegedly causing injury to the plaintiff. The Supreme Court concluded that 
proximity existed between plaintiff and the police chief, in part, because it was 
reasonable for members of the public to expect a chief of police “to be mindful of the 
injuries that might arise as a consequence of police misconduct”.119 This expectation 
was sensible, given the statutory duty to perform this oversight role imposed on the 
chief.120 On the other hand, proximity did not exist for the police services board, in 
large measure because the causal connection between that board’s putatively careless 
oversight and the actual injury suffered because of police officer conduct was too 
remote. In addition, there was no statutory duty analogous to that applicable to the 
chief.121 The Court arrived at a similar conclusion in relation to the province.122
Applying this first prong of the duty test to the diplomatic protection question, 
it may be reasonably foreseeable that a failure by the government to intervene 
properly with foreign officials in an abusive state might compound injury to the 
complainant; specifically, a harm that might otherwise be avoided or alleviated 
persists. For its part, the proximity requirement might be satisfied by the public 
expectation created by government pledges of assistance in the event of trouble 
abroad, as set out in the Foreign Affairs documents described above. On the other 
hand, the causal link between the injury suffered by the plaintiff at the hand of 
foreign officials and the government’s failure to extend protection may not be robust. 
Nor is such protection clearly mandated by statute (the Federal Court’s conclusions 
on the DFAIT Act in Khadr notwithstanding). Consular officials are therefore in a 
different position than police and firefighters, officials who courts have concluded 
are in sufficient proximity to the public. This absence of a clear statutory mandate 
obliging protection may gravely impair a plaintiff’s argument.124
117 Odhavji, supra note 112 at para. 48.
118 Ibid. at para. 50.
119 Ibid. at para. 57.
120 Ibid. at para. 58.
121 Ibid. at paras. 64-65.
122 Ibid. at para. 68 et seq.
123 See e.g. Doe, supra note 90 at 519; Hill v. Hamilton-Wentworth Regional Police Services Board 
(2005), 76 O.R. (3d) 481 (Ont. C.A.) (affirming that a duty of care exists such that police can be liable 
to a wrongfully charged person for negligent investigation); Gallagher v. Burlington (City), [1994] 
O.J. No. 255 (Ont. Gen. Div.), afFd [1997] O.J. No. 4195 (Ont. C.A.) (“the defendant [municipality] 
by establishing and maintaining a fire Department, in the exercise of a statuary power so to do, did 
place itself in a relationship to members of the public that carried with it a common law duty to take 
care” at para. 66); Ennis-Paikin Steel Ltd. v. Hamilton (City), [2006] O.J. No. 1262 (Ont. S.C.J.) (“A
Even if the plaintiff passed muster on these issues, consideration would turn to 
whether the prima facie duty established under the first prong would be negated by 
the second prong of the Anns test -  countervailing policy reasons. As suggested 
above, a key inquiry is whether the impugned government decision constitutes 
policy-making, rather than simply an execution of that policy. Where it amounts to a 
policy decision, government actors are not liable.125 Thus, in Cooper v. Hobert, the 
Supreme Court declined to find a duty of care where a decision taken by a 
government regulator in the performance of its functions required it to “balance 
public and private interests” and not simply carry out “a pre-determined government 
policy”, instead deciding “as an agent of the executive branch of government, what 
that policy should be.”126 In the diplomatic protection context, the government could 
marshal plausible arguments that decisions on diplomatic protection balance 
competing foreign policy objectives, placing the matter squarely in the zone of 
policy-making.
2. Diplomatic Protection and Standard of Care
If a duty exists, the next question is whether the defendant breached that duty by 
violating the applicable standard of care. The applicable standard of care is mutable. 
In Ryan v. Victoria (City), the Supreme Court specified that
[t]o avoid liability, a person must exercise the standard of care that would 
be expected of an ordinary, reasonable and prudent person in the same 
circumstances. The measure of what is reasonable depends on the facts of 
each case including the likelihood of a known or foreseeable harm, the 
gravity of that harm, and the burden or cost which would be incurred to 
prevent the injury. In addition, one may look to external indicators of 
reasonable conduct, such as custom, industry practice, and statutory or 
regulatory standards.127
On this second issue of custom and industry practice, there is some useful 
precedent from the Federal Court. In Khairy v. Canada ,128 the plaintiff sued the 
government, inter alia, in negligence after consular officials assisted his ex-wife in
municipal fire department owes a duty of care to the community it was created to protect. That duty of 
care is to respond to calls for assistance in a reasonable manner, consistent with established policies 
and procedures, and without negligence” at para. 150).
124 See Cooper v. Hobart, 2001 SCC 79 (examining whether a regulator owed a duty to those who 
benefited from the regulation and concluding “[i]n this case, the factors giving rise to proximity, if 
they exist, must arise from the statute under which the [regulator] is appointed. That statute is the only 
source of his duties, private or public. Apart from that statute, he is in no different position than the 
ordinary man or woman on the street” at para. 43).
125 Ibid. at para. 38.
126 Ibid. at para. 52.
127 [1999] 1 S.C.R. 201 at paras. 28-29.
128 2004 F.C. 1466.
removing their daughter from one country to another, putatively in violation of a 
custody order. At the same time, these consular officials refused to provide 
assistance to the plaintiff himself. In a motion to strike the Statement of Claim, a 
Federal Court prothonotary suggested that while international treaties like the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations created no duty of care for Canadian consular 
officials, “the treaties and conventions may provide guidance as to the standard of 
reasonable conduct to be expected of the consular officials in the context of an action 
in negligence”.129
On this line of reasoning, a failure to exhaust avenues available under Article 
36 of the VCCR -  permitting consular assistance to detained nationals -  would 
violate the standard of care. A second plausible source for a customary standard of 
care would be the stated policies and representations made in the Foreign Affairs 
Canada documents described above.
3. Diplomatic Protection and Causation
The plaintiff s last hurdle would be demonstrating that the injury -  presumably his or 
her detention -  is attributable, at least in part, to the government’s failure to meet its 
duty of care. The general test is a “but for” inquiry, questioning whether the injury 
would have occurred absent the defendant’s negligent action. Where there are 
multiple causes for the injury, this test is relaxed: “[t]he law does not excuse a 
defendant from liability merely because other causal factors for which he is 
not responsible also helped produce the harm”.130 The defendant’s conduct need not, 
in other words, be the sole cause.
As has been suggested several times already, in a case where the government’s 
failure to extend diplomatic protection (or to perform these functions properly) was 
at issue, demonstrating causation presents particular challenges. The injury arises at 
the hands of a foreign government. At best, the Canadian government’s inaction (or 
inept or inappropriate action) would compound the injury by permitting it to persist. 
However, proving that in the actual, individual case of the plaintiff, a failure to 
intercede properly caused or enhanced injury would be difficult. The plaintiff would 
have to demonstrate a counterfactual: that proper intercession would have made 
difference in his or her particular case. In a tort action, a plaintiff would likely only 
be successful if he or she could demonstrate a clear, past track-record of Canadian 
government success with such diplomatic and consular interventions with the 
relevant country. Even the Arar Commission, in its exhaustive review of Canadian 
behaviour in terms of Mr. Arar’s treatment in Syria, was “unable to conclude 
whether or not Canadian officials could have obtained Mr. Arar’s release from 
Syrian imprisonment at an earlier point in time” and confined itself to remarking on
129 Ibid. at para. 16.
130 Athey v. Leonati, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 458 at para. 19.
Canadian actions “that could have had an effect on the time taken to release Mr. 
Arar.”131
In sum, a lawsuit alleging negligence in the provision of diplomatic protection 
presents numerous difficulties. It is not impossible to imagine success, but that 
success would be hard-won in both law and fact.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set out in this article, a law of diplomatic protection exists in Canada, 
but remains quite rudimentary. No clear legal obligation to protect exists in 
Canadian public law, analogous to the emphatic constitutional provisions found in 
some other states. Nevertheless, Canada’s constitutional and administrative law 
doctrines do include some provisions potentially limiting the government’s ability to 
ignore citizens at risk abroad. At the very least, in declining diplomatic protection, 
the government cannot act in a patently unreasonable manner; that is, irrationally, in 
bad faith or for improper purposes. Meanwhile, a government that is delinquent in 
providing protection might conceivably be liable in the law of negligence, although 
this is far from certain.
What then does one make of this situation? The government of Canada 
provides consular services through “a network of more than 270 offices in over 180 
countries”.132 Most of the matters handled by these facilities are banal. Some, 
however, are quite serious, concerning the detention and possible mistreatment of 
Canadians by foreign governments. Under these circumstances, reasonable minds 
might question whether Canadian law should not be more demanding of government. 
Canadians would likely be distressed to learn that a government decision declining 
protection that falls just short of clearly irrational could be insulated from effective 
court review. Canadians might wonder why the various undertakings made in 
government documents about the scope of consular services are not codified as clear 
statutory duties. They might also be perplexed by the difficulty a potential plaintiff 
would have proving a case of negligence if these standards were ignored.
There is peril in grafting too much law onto the uncertainties of life, especially 
in the area of foreign relations. After all, consular officials may not be able to 
forestall all -  or even any -  of the harm that befalls Canadians. In a dangerous 
world, the government cannot guarantee against every eventuality. Even within 
Canada, we do not expect such ironclad protections from emergency service 
providers, such as police and firefighters. We do, however, expect these officials to 
have clear responsibilities, and be accountable where they fail to be met their 
obligations. Few objections should be raised to Canada’s diplomats and consular 
officers having a legal duty to at least do their best. Likewise, no objection should be 
voiced to their being held accountable when they act far short of that standard.
131 Arar Commission, supra note 1 at 14-15 [emphasis added].
132 Online: <http://www.voyage.gc.ca/main/about/who_what-en.asp>.
